FEDERAL COMMON
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO DISPUTES INVOLVING ACCRETIVE AND AVULSIVE CHANGES
IN THE BOUNDS OF NAVIGABLE WATERS
By John C. Cabaniss*
This article will explore the need and basis for applying a uniform federal common
law of riparian rights1 to determine property ownership when a change occurs in
the bounds of a navigable watercourse. The declaration of a uniform federal rule
is one of two alternatives open to a federal court once it has been established
that federal interests require the use of federal common law.2 The other available
alternative is the adoption of state law as the federal rule of decision.3
Several areas of potential federal interest will be discussed after the current
state of the law in each area is set forth. The proper choice of law for establishing
the initial boundary of a federal patent will first be addressed. This will be
followed by a review of whether federal or state law governs the riparian rights
possessed by one whose property was the subject of a prestatehood federal patent
when that property has been affected by a poststatehood accretive4 or avulsive5
change. Then, a portion of this note will focus on the similar but distinct issue
of what federal interests are present in determining the type and scope of title
acquired by the public land states upon their admission to statehood under the
equal footing doctrine.6 This topic is one of recent inconsistent decisions by
the United States Supreme Court. Also, the choice of law rule for locating an
interstate boundary which has been affected by an accretive or avulsive change
will be set forth. Finally, this note will consider what law should be employed
when an accretive or avulsive change affects property held in trust by the federal
government for an Indian tribe.
I. HISTORY OF
LAND AND WATER RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
When the colonies
achieved independence from British rule, each of the thirteen original states,
as a sovereign, succeeded to all interests in title previously held by the Crown
in the waters and riverbeds within their boundaries.7 In comparison, most of the
western states were formed out of land that had been held by the federal government
in trust for the establishment of future states.8 These western states are termed
the "public land states" as a consequence of the federal government's role as
sovereign prior to formation of the states.9
Because the public land states were once governed only by the federal government,
resolution of certain disputes which might adversely affect the scope of title
conveyed by the federal government prior to statehood must be examined pursuant
to federal law.10 In contrast, states without a history of federal land ownership
do not have this federal involvement. This disparity in treatment accorded to
various states has resulted from the diversity of state title histories. Additionally,
the varied history of land titles among the states has resulted in a diversity
of legal rules for determining ownership of the land beneath the high-water mark
of the water in each state.11 In most states, ownership of such land depends upon
whether or not the water is classified as navigable.12 If the water is deemed
non-navigable, generally, the title to the beds can be held by a private party.15
However, if the water is classified as navigable, then the land is held by most
states in their sovereign capacity in order to further the public need associated
with navigation and fishery.14
Within the public lands, prior to statehood, the federal government held title
to the beds beneath the navigable waters.15 As states were formed out of this
land, they were admitted on an "equal footing" with the existing states.16 This
admission upon equal footing was held to be constitutionally required so that
new states would be admitted with the same sovereign rights accorded to the original
thirteen states.17 Further, it was held that this doctrine required the federal
government to relinquish its interest in title to the land beneath the navigable
waters of the public lands to the new states upon their admission to the union.
Although this doctrine mandated a conveyance to the states of the beds beneath
their navigable waters on the date when statehood was granted, it did not completely
eradicate the federal interests present.19 The determination of what waters were
navigable at the time statehood was granted was held to be a federal question
to be measured by the federal test of navigability.20 Thus, federal courts decide
what subaqueous lands were conveyed to the states upon their admission to the
union pursuant to federal standards.
Federal title in non-navigable waters and the beds beneath them continued within
the newly formed states.21 This federal ownership complemented the large quantity
of land owned by the federal government. The extent of the federal interests created
a potential water use conflict between persons who were appropriating water pursuant
to state appropriation systems and persons that would subsequently acquire title
as federal patentees.22 The appropriators feared that the federal courts might
recognize riparian rights in patentees that would diminish their right to an established
quantity of water. By adopting an appropriation system of water use, the western
states acted to encourage development in an arid region where assurance of a constant
water supply was essential to induce settlement.23 To quell state concerns over
federal interference with state systems of water allocation, Congress passed the
Acts of 186624 and 187025 which gave vested state water use rights priority over
the claims of federal patentees.26 These Acts, however, left open the possibility
that a federal patentee's riparian rights to the water might be accorded higher
priority than the rights of a subsequent state appropriator. Congress acted to
remedy this oversight by passing the Desert Land Act of 1877.27 This Act has been
held to have severed the unappropriated waters from the federal lands riparian
to them.28 This severance was based on the federal proprietary right to the water
and allowed the states to establish their own independent systems of water use
allocation.29 However, the Act failed to specify what rights, if any, were retained
by federal riparian land patentees. The states have contended that the Desert
Land Act was nothing short of a complete surrender of federal power over water
use rights to the states.30 This assertion of absolute state power was rejected
by the Court when it held the Act inapplicable to lands held in trust by the federal
government for Indian tribes. This holding was based on the Court's finding that
implied in reservation treaties were reserved rights to enough water to permit
its use on all irrigable reservation lands.31
Congressional legislation concerning waterways and land riparian thereto has usually
been based on the Commerce and/or Property clauses.32 The navigational power,
which flows from the Commerce clause,33 has been construed to give the federal
government a navigational servitude that extends to the ordinary high-water mark.34
This servitude has been held to be superior to private property interests found
to interfere with the federal government's interest in navigation.'5 In contrast
to the unquestioned superiority of the federal navigational power when exercised
in conflict with a state or individual interest, it is unclear how the property
clause applies to the resolution of federal-state disputes.36 In decisions considering
reserved water rights for Indian reservation land, the power of the federal government
to grant implied reservations has been held to flow from the Property and Commerce
clauses.37 The Court in dicta in Paul v. United States38 seemed to accept the
view that federal property, acquired without state consent, would be held as if
held by any other private owner subject to rights defined by state law.39 This
view of the Property clause's scope was repudiated by the Court in Kleppe v. New
Mexico.40 There, it was held that, regardless of state consent, the Property clause
empowered Congress to exercise "the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature
over the public domain."41 Hence, Congressional authority over the public lands
is not controlled by state law.42 However, state law can limit the use of federal
property to the extent it does not affect the government's title or interfere
with its right of disposal.43
The problems considered by this article arise when the bounds of a water body
change. Under both federal and state law, when such a change is deemed to be the
result of accretion, riparian owners gain title to any resulting additions to
their property.44 Conversely, when erosion occurs the riparian owner loses title
to the land that is consumed by the water.45 The application of the accretion
doctrine is premised on the rationale that an upland owner's access to the water
should be maintained whenever possible without creating an undue hardship on abutting
property owners. It has been stated that the effect of the accretion doctrine
is to give riparian owners a fee that is determinable upon the occupancy of their
land by the river.46 Likewise, title to the riverbed is subject to defeasance
upon a reliction by the river.47 In comparison, the avulsion doctrine48 is used
to maintain title boundaries where they were prior to a sudden and drastic change
in a watercourse even if this results in a loss of accessto the water for some
property owners.49 This doctrine is employed when necessary to minimize the hardship
that would result to abutting landowners if the accretion doctrine was followed.50
The courts have thus recognized that if followed without exception, the accretion
doctrine would on occasion result in an inequitable redistribution of property
among property owners following a drastic change in the bounds of a waterway.
II. FACTORS AFFECTING
THE USE AND CONTENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Under Swift v. Tyson,51
the Rules of Decision Act was held to allow the federal courts to develop a general
body of common law applicable to all disputes that were not strictly matters of
"local law".52 This remained the law of the land until 1938 when the Supreme Court,
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkims,53 a suit based on diversity jurisdiction, overruled
Swift by holding that state law applied, including state decisional law, unless
supplanted by the Constitution or an act of Congress. Following Erie, the test
of what law, federal or state, is used in diversity actions has evolved into a
consideration of the policies that underlie Erie.54 These policies were held to
be "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration
of the laws."55 Although at first glance Erie might appear to eliminate any use
of federal common law, the Court, on the same day Erie was issued, held that federal
common law governed resolution of a dispute between two states involving apportionment
of waters in an interstate stream.56 Thus, federal common law does exist.
Before a federal court can adjudicate a dispute, it must generally be demonstrated
that either federal question or diversity jurisdiction exists.57 Actions based
on claims arising under federal law-Constitution, laws of the United States, or
treaties-are within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts.58
However, there are several situations where the Court has recognized the need
for granting federal question jurisdiction despite the fact that the issue presented
did not arise directly from the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States. The Court in Clearfield Trust Co. V. United, States59 held that when Congress
has not addressed an issue which is "substantially related to an established program
of governmental operation,"60 federal courts must fill the existing gaps in federal
law according to federal standards.61 Also, in United, States V. Standard, Oil
Co.,62 the Court held that the federal nature of the relationship between a soldier
and the government required federal common law to govern the legal consequences
of that relationship.63 In both of these situations the Court developed federal
common law.64 The Court has also held that federal common law can independently
supply the necessary federal question jurisdiction since it is included within
the constitutional meaning of "laws of the United States."65
Once the source of law is found to be federal, then the federal courts must apply
a federal rule of decision. If the issue presented in a particular case is not
resolved expressly by reference to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States, then federal common law controls. In applying federal common law,
a court must choose whether to adopt state law or develop a uniform federal rule
as the rule of decision.66 A test for determining what law to apply has not been
consistently used by the Court. However, certain factors have reappeared in the
cases. The Court has sometimes used a balancing test which weighs the federal
and state interests.67 On other occasions the Court has only focused on a more
limited set of factors which it considers controlling while ignoring any comprehensive
review of the factors it has previously deemed important.68 This inconsistent
approach makes it difficult to predict with any confidence what the Court will
find relevant in a particular situation.
In Clearfield Trust,69 the Supreme Court opted for the use of a uniform federal
rule by dismissing adoption because it would subject the rights and duties of
the United States "to the vagaries of the laws of the several states."70 The Court
found the federal interest in having identical law apply to the numerous transactions
in federal commercial paper to outweigh the state interest in having state law
govern completely the commercial transaction at issue. 71 Despite Clearfield Trust's
emphasis on uniformity for cases dealing with federal commercial paper, in Bank
of America v. Parnell,72 the Court held that issues regarding rights in federal
commercial paper that do not touch on the rights and duties of the federal government
were matters to be resolved by state law even though a companion issue was present
that had to be governed by federal law.7' Thus, Parnell stands for the proposition
that even though the federal government may have an interest in particular property,
unless its interests are affected by the decision, state law should apply.
Uniformity, as recognized by the Court in Clearfield Trust, is a major factor
which supports the use of a uniform federal rule. In some cases the Court has
weighed against the need for uniformity the state interest in having its own law
apply because the issue presented was one of traditionally local concern.74 Also,
the Court has sometimes considered whether a conflict exists between the application
of a particular state law and federal interests.75 In United States V. Little
Lake Misere, the Court did not adopt the available state law because it was found
to be hostile to the purposes of the federal program at issue.76 However, the
Court left open the possibility that a nonconflicting state statute dealing with
the same issue might be adopted if a similar dispute arose in another state.77
This approach suggests that the Court desires a case by case appraisal of the
interests present. Contrary to the Erie diversity situation where there is a lack
of court competence to decide substantive issues, in this situation a court remains
free to control the extent and effect of adoption so that federal interests will
be protected.78
It has been suggested that a federal court, in deciding whether to adopt state
law, should additionally consider the effect of ifs decision on the distribution
of power between the federal and state courts.79 Also of importance is the ability
of each court system to handle the issue presented. For example, the call for
"uniformity" usually is the chief argument in support of establishing a uniform
federal rule; yet, the only way a truly uniform rule can be promulgated is by
Supreme Court action. This fact precludes the use of a uniform rule in many areas
because the Court's workload is so heavy that it does not have the time to develop
detailed substantive rules.80 These factors should always be considered by the
courts as part of a balancing approach to help determine, as a matter of judicial
policy, what law is most appropriate for use in the case at bar.81
III. CURRENT USE
OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. Scope of a
Federal Grant
The city of Los Angeles
brought an action to quiet title in Borax Consolidate, Ltd. V. Los Angeles.82
There, the Court addressed a dispute involving the issue of whether land that
had been conveyed under a federal patent was upland or tideland at the time of
the federal grant. If tideland, it was erroneously included in the federal patent
since upon California's admission to the union it acquired all right, title and
interest in the tidelands. Conversely, if found to have been upland, it was properly
included in the federal patent. The Court determined that the primary question
posed by this case was the extent of the federal patent. Since the question presented
involved "the validity and effect of an act done by the United States," it was
held to implicate a federal interest.83 Thus, the Court established where the
boundary between the upland and tideland was according to federal principles.84
Although the Court in Borax held that federal law governed the scope of title
acquired by a federal patentee, in subsequent cases the Court has held that state
law controls with respect to the property rights afforded to private owners.85
B. Rights of a
Federal Patentee Following an Accretive or Avulsive Change
The Borax holding
was expanded by the Court in Hughes V. Washington86 to aid the Court in deciding
whether federal or state law applied to determine the ownership of land gradually
deposited by the ocean on upland property. In Hughes, the upland property had
been conveyed by the federal government to the petitioner's predecessor in title
prior to Washington's grant of statehood.87 If the land in question had been accreted
prior to statehood, under a uniform federal rule the riparian owner would have
been entitled to it.88 Washington claimed that Article 17, 1 of its Constitution
provided that it would gain title to any coastal accretions occurring after 1889.50
This was the State's position despite the fact that the Washington Supreme Court
had previously rejected that interpretation in Ghione V. State.90
In Hughes, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed its prior holding and found
that the State's Constitution of 1889 had eliminated the application of the riparian
doctrine of accretion to property riparian to the Pacific Ocean. Thus, the court
held that the State held title to all land formed by coastal accretions.91 The
case then went to the United States Supreme Court where the applicability of federal
law was at issue. The state argued there was no federal interest present and that
Borax was inapplicable because it did not deal with riparian rights. Notwithstanding
this argument, the Court found that there was no "significant difference" between
this case and Borax. Consequently, it held that the question of what rights were
included in the initial federal grant was sufficient to justify the exercise of
federal question jurisdiction. Moreover, the use of a uniform rule was found to
be necessary to protect the scope of the federal patentee's title.92 It was noted
that to hold otherwise would leave riparian owners in danger of losing the most
valuable feature of their land - access to the water.93
The Court's majority opinion in Hughes relied on Borax in holding that the issue
presented required in effect a determination of a federal patent's original scope.
In reaching its decision the Court did not discuss or attempt to distinguish Borax
and Hughes from its earlier decision in Joy V. City of St. Louis.94 In Joy, a
riparian owner, whose title descended from a prestatehood federal grant, claimed
that the federal origin of his title implicated a sufficient federal interest
to support federal question jurisdiction in a dispute involving ownership of accretions
deposited adjacent to his land.95 The Court, however, held that the federal origin
of the grant did not by itself present a federal question.96 The Court went on
to note that the dispute did not involve the land actually conveyed or an act
of Congress. Consequently, the lower court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
was affirmed. Joy, thus, stands for the well settled rule that federal law should
not be applied merely because the United States happens to be a party in the chain
of title.97
C. The Type and
Scope of Title Acquired by the Public Land States Upon Their Admission to the
Union Under the Equal Footing Doctrine
The Court extended
the use of federal common law in Bonelli Cattle Co. V. Arizona.98 This ease involved
a dispute over land that was included in a prestatehood federal patent to a railroad
company. The land was riparian to the Colorado River and upon admission to the
union, Arizona succeeded to the federal government's title in the bed of the river.99
Over the years, the river gradually moved eastward engulfing the subject land.
As this process occurred the State mechanically acquired title to the land as
part of the riverbed.100 When the cattle company acquired its title in 1955, most
of the property conveyed by the original grant was under water and, therefore,
held by the State. In 1959, a project by the Federal Bureau of Reclamation deepened
and rechanneled the river, thereby resulting in the re-emergence of a substantial
portion of the original parcel.101 The State claimed this change was avulsive,
and argued that title to the land which formed the bed of the river prior to reclamation
remained in the state by virtue of the equal footing doctrine and the Submerged
Lands Act.102 The cattle company alleged the change to be accretive. Alternatively,
the company asserted that even if the change was deemed avulsive, it had reacquired
title under the doctrine of reemergence.103 The Arizona Supreme Court, however,
rejected the company's position and held the change to be avulsive with title
vested in the State.104
In Bonelli, the United States Supreme Court first had to decide whether ownership
of the subject land was to be governed by state or federal law. The Court stated
its continued adherence to the principle that state law should determine rights
in the beds of navigable waters whose title was indefeasibly vested by federal
law in the states. It was noted by the Court, however, that the issue was not
what rights the state had accorded to private owners, but what type of title the
state had acquired under the equal footing doctrine and Submerged Lands Act.105
The Court found that construction of this doctrine and the Act involved a "right
asserted under federal law"; therefore, it presented a federal question.106 After
an examination of the policies behind the avulsion and accretion doctrines, the
Court held that the state had acquired a fee determinable to the land that had
gradually eroded into the river.107 When this land re-emerged, the state's interest
in the former riverbed was held to be defeased and title reverted to the riparian
owner. The Court reasoned that when the water receded from the subject property
there was no longer a public purpose being served by state retention of title
to the re-emerged tract.108 Further, it was stated that, if allowed, continued
state ownership of this property would have allowed the deprived private owner
to possibly raise a constitutional objection that the state's assertion of title
had resulted in a taking without just compensation.109 This issue was not addressed
by the Court because, after balancing the federal and state interests, it held
that title to the re-emerged land should be governed by the federal principle
of accretion to protect the riparian owner's right of access to the water and
to prevent the state's receipt of a land windfall.110
Growth of the federal common law of riparian rights was curtailed and severely
restricted when the Court overruled Bonelli in Oregon V. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co.111 The dispute in Corvallis centered on the issue of whether the State or
the Corvallis Sand and Gravel Company owned land which formed a peninsula known
as the Fischer Cut.112 The Willamette River flowed around this peninsula, but
by 1890 a channel had formed across its neck. During periods when the river's
flow was intermediate to high, the new channel would carry part of the resulting
flow. In 1909, a major flood occurred which resulted in the entire Fischer Cut
being submerged. Subsequent to this change the company used the area in its digging
operations for 40-50 years. Oregon brought suit to eject Corvallis Sand from the
property claiming that it was owner in fee simple of the disputed land. This claim
was based on the assertion that as new beds were formed under navigable waters,
fee simple title to them automatically vested in the state as an incident of sovereignty
under the equal footing doctrine.113 The Oregon courts used federal common law
as set forth in Bonelli to award the disputed land to Corvallis Sand under either
the avulsion theory or pursuant to an exception to the accretion rule.114
The Supreme Court in Corvallis held that the state court had erred in treating
the equal footing doctrine as the source of a federal interest which required
application of a uniform federal rule to questions concerning title acquired by
the states from the federal government to the riverbeds beneath navigable waters.115
Not only was this basis for federal question jurisdiction rejected, but the Court
also stated that the mere fact a parcel of land had originally been conveyed by
a federal grant does not give rise to a controversy arising under the laws of
the United States.116 Borax was explained by the Court as only being applicable
to disputes involving the location of an original boundary.117 Hughes was not
considered since it was not cited below by the Oregon courts. This abrupt change
in the Court's analysis resulted in the quick burial of Bonelli as the basis for
applying federal common law. Consequently, it appears that disputes concerning
land ownership will now be resolved solely as a matter of state law unless a federal
interest other than federal origin of title or conveyance under the equal footing
doctrine can be established.118
D. Disputes Over
Interstate Boundaries
Disputes involving
the location of interstate boundaries affected by accretive or avulsive changes
have consistently been recognized by the courts and commentators as requiring
the use of a uniform federal rule.119 The Supreme Court has held that even though
the issue is not governed explicitly by the Constitution or federal statute, federal
common law principles of accretion and avulsion must necessarily be developed
and used to avoid the problems inherent in adopting state law to resolve interstate
conflicts.120 This approach was used in Arkansas v. Tennessee,121 where a river,
which indicated the interstate boundary, suddenly changed course. The Court declared
that state law would determine the rights of riparian owners within their own
state, but that a state could not render a decision that might affect an interstate
boundary.122 Since classification of a change as accretive or avulsive can determine
whether a state gains or loses property along an interstate boundary, the Court
used a uniform federal rule to resolve the issue of what type of change occurred.123
E. Disputes Over
Land Held in Trust by the Federal Government
The Courts have recognized
a federal interest in protecting lands held in trust by the United States for
American Indian tribes. Most of the Indian tribes occupy reservations that were
set aside for them by federal treaty or executive order.124 Within reservation
boundaries, property and sovereign rights exist that cannot be derogated by state
or federal law.125 Furthermore, the existence of reservations and commerce with
them is controlled by the federal government.126 In Oneida Indian Nation v. County
of Oneida,127 the Court held that the issue of whether the Oneidas had a valid
claim to possession of disputed property pursuant to a treaty with the federal
government was a matter governed by federal law.
The Oneida holding was recently reaffirmed by the Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe.128 In Wilson a dispute arose over ownership of land that originally was
included in the Omaha Indian tribe's reservation which was located in 1867 on
the west bank of the Missouri River in Nebraska. Following the establishment of
the reservation, the river changed course several times with the result that a
portion of the original reservation ended up on the east side of the river in
Iowa. This land was subsequently settled by non-Indians. The federal government
and the Omahas brought suit to quiet title in the disputed lands claiming that
the changes in the Missouri river's course had been avulsive and, therefore, the
boundaries of the reservation should remain unaffected. The non-Indian residents
argued that the changes in the river's course resulted from a gradual process
of erosion and accretion, thereby passing title to the east bank riparian owners.129
The Court held that the Indians' claim to the property was to be resolved by federal
law citing Oneida to support its holding that questions regarding Indian occupancy
of reservations are "exclusively [within] the province of federal law."130 While
adopting the Oneida holding that the adjudication of rights involving reservation
lands implicates a federal interest requiring use of a federal common law, the
Wilson Court held that state law should be adopted as the federal rule of decision.131
The Court reached its decision after considering the factors it set forth in United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.132 There it had grappled with a choice between adopting
state law or applying a uniform federal rule to govern the relative priority between
a private lien and a federally created lien. In Wilson the Court concluded that
there was no need to develop a uniform federal rule since an interstate boundary
was not in dispute. Further, the Court expressed concern that a uniform federal
rule would result in disparaging treatment of the private property owners located
next to the Indian reservation. The fear was that they might have their boundary
disputes resolved differently than persons who were not similarly located adjacent
to an Indian reservation.133 The Court also asserted that state law would be applied
in an equitable fashion and that a tribe might gain as well as lose land. Finally,
the Court stated that it would not accept "generalized pleas for uniformity as
substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect
[federal interests] "154
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Extent of a
Federal Grant
In Borax the Court
held that the initial boundaries of federal grants are to be determined according
to federal rules of construction. This approach was chosen as necessary to protect
private interests acquired pursuant to federal dispositions of property. If state
law were allowed to deter mine the scope of federal grants, it could operate to
impair the validity of the congressional act which authorized the conveyance.
This would run afoul of the supremacy clause135 and Congress' power to dispose
of federal property pursuant to the property clause.136 Since disputes involving
the extent of a federal grant present questions regarding rights accorded by federal
law, federal question jurisdiction is present to govern such disputes.137 It should
be noted that Borax was decided prior to Erie and it, therefore, contained no
discussion of adopting state law as the federal rule of decision.
B. Rights of a
Federal Patentee After an Accretive or Avulsive Change
The Court has left
unresolved the direct conflict between Hughes and the Corvallis and Joy line of
cases. Corvallis and Joy considered the issue of whether a federal patent provided
a basis for federal question jurisdiction, thereby enabling the courts to use
federal common law to determine whether a poststatehood change was accretive or
avulsive.135 In Corvallis, the Court refused to reconsider Hughes since it was
not relied on below. The Court did hint in a footnote that the fact Hughes involved
a parcel of land on the boundary of an international sea might have been sufficient
to justify the use of federal common law.139 If the federal courts do indeed have
the power to determine the future right to accretions on such oceanfront property
based upon the federal interests involved in the location of an international
boundary, then the equal footing doctrine would be as offended as it is in similar
non-oceanfront disputes since federal law has not been applied to govern a change
that affected oceanfront property in one of the original 13 states.140 Thus, this
distinction lacks merit. Either the prestatehood federal grant is a basis for
federal question jurisdiction or it is not, and the weight of authority is that
it is not. Therefore, the continued validity of the majority opinion in Hughes
on this point is doubtful and it appears to be an isolated decision with little
validity after Corvallis.
Joy held that state law should control to determine whether an accretive or avulsive
change had occurred when such a change affected land that had been the subject
of a prestatehood federal grant.141 In its holding the Court noted that state
law could impair the federal patentee's use and enjoyment of his property, but
the Court failed to adequately explore the effect of this limitation on state
court authority to deny a riparian owner water access. Thus, the Court ignored
the possibility that a right granted by federal law could be eroded by state law.
This result was supported by the assertion that the Constitution requires, via
the equal footing doctrine, that the states established subsequent to our nation's
founding acquire the same sovereign rights as the original 13 states. Although
the equal footing doctrine does require equality of sovereign rights, it is inevitable,
as a consequence of the federal government's initial ownership of large quantities
of western land, that the federal impact there will be greater than in the east.
The federal government conveyed property by grants prior to statehood in the territories.
By virtue of this federal origin of title, the application of federal law is required
to determine the extent of these original conveyances.142 The result is a displacement
of state rules of construction. In the founding 13 states, this application of
federal principles is not required. However, it is not asserted that this federal
involvement infringes on state sovereignty, rather, it is perceived as a reflection
of the need to protect the scope of the federal title conveyed.
Although at first glance the foregoing analysis may seem to be inapposite to the
equal footing doctrine, it might only be the result of the varied histories and
not an interference with state sovereignty. The Court has noted that the equal
footing doctrine was not intended to destroy all differences but was only intended
to insure parity with regard to political standing and sovereignty.143 The state's
sovereign rights were not deemed to have been undermined by granting the riparian
owner the right to accretions under federal law by the Hughes Court, but Hughes
now appears to be little more than an aberration.
The federal jurisdiction in Hughes rested solely on the fact that the petitioner
could trace her title to a prestatehood federal grant. This is precisely the type
of case where as a general rule state law has governed.144 The Hughes decision
was reached as a result of a misplaced expansion of Borax. The Court in Borax
explicitly stated that the only issue present was whether the land in controversy
was upland or tideland when California was admitted to the union. If found to
be tideland then the Court recognized that the State's title would be complete
and, therefore, nondefeasable.146 Consequently, where Borax dealt exclusively
with the scope of title initially conveyed by federal grant, the Hughes Court
attempted to use it to justify a continuing federal interpretation of poststatehood
property changes. This approach ignored and placed little weight on the history
of state control over real property issues which had long been recognized and
protected by application of the equal footing doctrine. Further, as an indication
of the Court's brief and faulty analysis in Hughes, the Court there stated that
it could choose to select state law as the federal rule but declined to do so
by asserting that Borax had held that no such choice should be made in this area
of the law.147 What the Court failed to recognize was that Borax was decided prior
to Erie when there was no adoption of state law, and, thus, that possibility had
not been considered as an option. Consequently, Borax should not have been cited
as controlling on that issue.
The Court's real concern in Hughes might have been that addressed by Justice Stewart
in his concurring opinion. In it, he accepted the state's power to change and
fully determine the laws governing riparian rights. He saw this power as an incident
of the state's constitutionally delegated control over real property matters.
Justice Stewart did not think this delegation of authority to the states should
be manipulated to prevent state abuses. Instead, he found that the needed protection
for individual property owners was provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendments'
proscription against state confiscation of property rights without just compensation.148
This proposed use of constitutional safeguards to protect valuable riparian rights
would have allowed the Court to accord proper deference to state real property
law while preventing the type of state abuse which prompted the Court to manipulate
the equal footing doctrine. So far the Court has not acted to so extend fifth
and fourteenth amendment protections.
A Hawaii federal district court in Robinson V. Ariyoshi149 held that a radical
departure by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in its interpretation of well established
water law resulted in the taking of private property without just compensation.150
This constitutional violation was found to support the court's exercise of federal
question jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hughes. Also, its finding was based by implication
on the assumption that since the fourteenth amendment applied to courts in other
areas, that the fifth amendment's proscription against taking without just compensation
as applied to the states by incorporation through the fourteenth amendment also
applied and limited the state judiciary.151 The taking analysis employed in Robinson
by the court has been termed by a commentator as the laymen's view.152 Using this
approach, the court quantitatively compared the private property rights possessed
before and after the state court's decision. Since the private property rights
had diminished, the court held that the state court decision had resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of property rights without just compensation. 153
The Hawaii federal court's finding that it possessed original jurisdiction to
determine whether the state court's action in this matter was constitutional was
rejected by the fifth circuit in Reynolds V. Georgia.154 The plaintiff in Reynolds
claimed that an unpredictable decision by a state court had deprived her of fifth
amendment rights. Although the fifth circuit accepted the proposition that a state
court decision could operate unconstitutionally to deprive a person of their property,
it held that this determination was for an appellate court to make. Consequently,
the court in Reynolds held that federal district courts are not empowered to hear
appellate issues since they only possess original jurisdiction. In support of
its decision, the Reynolds court cited Rooker V. Fidelity Trust Co.155 There,
the Supreme Court held that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction to hear
a claim that a state's highest court had acted unconstitutionally. Thus, although
the Robinson decision has not been overturned, it stands alone for the proposition
it sets forth.
Without using constitutional safeguards, the Court has attempted on occasion to
broaden the scope of federal interests to impose some federal protection for riparian
rights.lse In Hughes, the Court implicitly recognized that without federal protection
the state judiciary would be able to deprive the riparian federal patentee of
the most valuable attribute of her land-her right of access to the water. The
Court there relied on Borax in finding that deprivation of this riparian right
was not distinguishable from allowing state law to interpret the original extent
of federal grants.157 In both instances, if state law were controlling, it would
have enabled the state to diminish the value of a grant that was created by federal
law pursuant to constitutionally delegated powers.
In conclusion, although absolute equality of treatment for the states is impossible,
the Court should require an overwhelming justification for imposing federal common
law on the states in an area of predominantly state concern. In Hughes there was
some justification as described above for finding federal question jurisdiction
but, if allowed on the basis of a federal patent alone, it would be such a broad
expansion of jurisdiction that federal regard for the states' right to control
real property would be significantly diminished. Therefore, the needed protection
might be better provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.
C. The Type and
Scope of Title Conveyed to the Public Land States Under the Equal Footing Doctrine
Bonelli, like Hughes,
was an expansion by the Court of Borax. In Bonelli, the Court held that federal
law applied because the issue involved the extent of title acquired by Arizona
under the equal footing doctrine and Submerged Lands Act. The Court acknowledged
that if the land in question had vested in the state there would be no federal
question jurisdiction present.158 However, the Court held that Arizona had not
acquired a fee simple to the bed of the river upon its admission to statehood.
Instead, it found that the State bad a fee determinable upon the reliction of
the water. Thus, when the land in dispute re-emerged, the state no longer had
an interest in the property, and it reverted to the riparian owner. This novel
approach allowed the Court to sidestep consideration of the assertion that retention
by the state of title would amount to a taking without just compensation.159 Additionally,
the Court failed to adequately explain why the equal footing doctrine would not
preclude this approach. Jurisdiction on these facts boiled down to the fact that
the federal government as sovereign had owned the riverbed prior to Arizona's
statehood and, therefore, it could determine the type of title conveyed to the
state. However, no such federal interest is present in the original thirteen states
which lack a history of federal ownership. This is precisely the type of disparity
the equal footing doctrine was intended to prevent, and several Supreme Court
decisions have held that the new states have the same rights to the soil beneath
their waters as do the original states.160
In Weber V. Harbor Commissioners, the Court stated that California upon admission
to the union had acquired "absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty
over, all soils under the [waters]" and consequently the state could dispose of
title to the beds in any manner it might deem proper.161 The only mentioned limitation
on this absolute right was the federal navigational servitude which was not at
issue in Bonelli.162 Surely, if Arizona had exercised its right to convey the
submerged property to a private owner prior to its re-emergence, the Court would
not have found the owner's fee determinable upon the water's reliction. Furthermore,
as in Hughes, the Bonelli Court failed to recognize that Borax only applies to
questions regarding the extent of title conveyed at the time statehood was granted.
The parties in Corvallis did not request that the Court reexamine Bonelli, but
several states in amicus briefs did urge that Bonelli be reviewed and overturned.
The Court reviewed Bonelli and found that in Bonelli it had erred in holding that
federal common law governed resolution of the dispute there. Accordingly, the
Court held that property once subject to state law was not subject to defeasance
by operation of federal common law. After Corvallis, it appears that federal law
will only be applied to determine the original boundary of property conveyed by
the federal government.
D. Adoption of
State Law When a Dispute Involves Land Held In Trust by the Federal Government
The Wilson holding
reaffirms an Indian tribe's right to an adjudication before a federal forum whenever
reservation land is involved in a title dispute. Despite this recognition of the
need for federal protection of tribal land rights, the Court did not find it necessary
to use a uniform federal rule of decision.163 Instead, the Court found that the
Indians' interest in having a uniform federal rule apply was outweighed by a substantial
state interest in having its own law apply. One factor that appeared to be important
to the Court in making this determination was what it perceived would be the inequity,
if it used a uniform federal rule, of having disputes involving private owners
resolved in one manner under state law while disputes between private owners and
an Indian tribe would be resolved in a different manner with a uniform federal
rule.164 In contrast, the Court has not found a similarly substantial state interest
in having state law govern disputes between private riparian owners that are situated
on interstate boundaries, even though such owners have their disputes which involve
the interstate boundary resolved by a uniform federal rule, while neighbors not
on the boundary have similar disputes decided under state law. 165
The Wilson Court recognized in deciding whether to adopt state law as the federal
rule of decision that it should consider a variety of factors that were relevant
to the governmental interests involved.166 However, the Court's subsequent analysis
was insufficient in that it relied exclusively upon the factors set forth in United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.167 The factors set forth in Kimbell were used to
determine whether state law should be adopted in a controversy involving a nationwide
federal commercial program. Accordingly, the Court in Kimbell did not set forth
an exclusive list of factors to be used under all circumstances to determine whether
state law should be adopted. The Wilson Court, however, failed to consider factors
other than those set forth in the commercial law context of Kimbell. Specifically,
it did not take notice of the fact that Indian reservations have a special, federally-created
sovereign status that should have been considered in determining whether to use
a uniform federal rule.168
In Wilson, the Court also failed to properly apply the uniformity factor used
in Kimbell.169 In addition to the misplaced emphasis on intrastate uniformity
as indicated above, uniformity was also used in a manner that failed to give appropriate
weight to the fact that when the various American Indian tribes, including the
Omahas, negotiated separately with the United States government for a resolution
of the conflicts between them, they acted in a sovereign capacity and relied upon
the authority of the federal government to conclude a treaty that would serve
as a satisfactory indication of the rights each would possess in an ongoing relationship.170
By treaty the Omahas relinquished far-reaching territorial claims of sovereignty
in exchange for a promise by the federal government that it would hold an established
area of land in trust for the tribe to use and occupy.171 By failing to use the
available federal principles of accretion and avulsion for disputes involving
Indian land, the Court ignored the tribe's expectations of having complete federal
protection for its interests. These expectations were created by the government's
recognition of the tribe's status as a foreign nation during the treatying process
as well as the need to protect tribal land and affairs from state governmental
interference. Thus, it was reasonable that the tribe would assume that this type
of dispute would be resolved by applying the well developed uniform federal principles
of accretion and avulsion.172 However, the Omahas' expectation interests were
ignored by the Court.
The Court also stated that federal jurisdiction alone would be sufficient to insure
that federal interests were not impaired.173 This assertion, however, ignored
the fact that -reservation land and water rights were granted to the tribe in
its sovereign capacity with the expectation that federal law and principles would
govern all aspects of the tribe's relationship with the federal government. Although
federal courts can control when state law is adopted, this decision makes it possible
that state law will be applied in certain cases to deprive an Indian tribe of
riparian rights where federally developed principles would have protected such
rights.174 The Court acknowledged this when it stated that although the application
of state law could on occasion result in a tribe losing land, on other occasions
the tribe would be as likely to gain property by virtue of the application of
state law. Thus, in Wilson the Court found that the state interests in having
state law apply outweighed the federal interest in treating similarly situated
Indian tribes uniformly. The Court did not find state interests to so outweigh
federal interests in Hughes where the federal interests present were not as substantial
as they were in Wilson.
The federal courts, in developing a uniform federal rule of accretion and avulsion,
have been sensitive to the underlying rationale of the doctrines whereas some
state courts have stuck rigidly to the mechanical distinction between the definitions
of accretion and avulsion in developing the law in this area with little regard
for the underlying purposes of the doctrines.175 This difference should at least
have been considered by the Court in evaluating the factors to be used in deciding
whether to use a uniform federal rule. Additionally, the Court should have considered
as relevant the fact that the use of a uniform federal rule to determine whether
the change was accretive or avulsive would not have resulted in an undue burden
on the judicial system since a federal body of law to govern such disputes has
already been developed.176 This law could easily have been applied, and it would
not have required any significant Supreme Court involvement. Also, the use of
a uniform federal rule would assure that such disputes were resolved by the application
of the principles underlying the accretion and avulsion doctrines and not by a
state's reliance on a mechanical distinction based solely on the rate of change
of a waterbody's bounds regardless of the equities involved.
Since the federal government holds title to reservation lands, state law should
govern only to the extent that it does not interfere with federal title.177 By
adopting state law to govern when uniform federal rules have already been developed
for similar disputes involving interstate boundaries, the Court has allowed state
law to determine the extent of federally created property rights. This is inapposite
to the Court's Borax holding.178 It also conflicts with the property clause which
has been held to require that when state law is exercised to control rights affecting
federal property, it must not interfere with the federal government's right of
disposal.179 Here, as a result of adopting state principles of accretion and avulsion,
the land has been held not to be part of the reservation. Therefore, the federal
government has been deprived of any possible future right of disposal by the adoption
of state law as the federal rule of decision.
It has been held that although the federal government did not expressly reserve
water use rights for the Indian tribes in treaties with them, there are implied
reservation rights which appropriate sufficient quantities of water for the irrigable
land within the reservations.180 In developing this reserved water rights doctrine,
the Court recognized the unique nature of society's obligation to the American
Indians and its federal origin.181 The Court has applied this doctrine to permit
withdrawal of water from state systems of appropriation. This infringement upon
the state's sovereign power over water was deemed necessary to insure an adequate
supply of water for the Indians in an arid region and it protected their expectation
of a continued water supply. Just as reserved rights are of prime importance to
the Indians, the right of access to water is equally important. After Wilson,
if an accretive or avulsive change occurs in a waterbody bounding a reservation,
state law will likely determine the nature of such a change. Thus, an Indian tribe
could end up losing its right of access to water based upon the application of
a state law that embodies a mechanical distinction between the accretion and avulsion
doctrines. In Hughes, the Court recognized that the potential loss of access to
the ocean by a federal patentee was not a loss that should be accepted; therefore,
it required the use of a uniform federal rule to protect federal interests.182
Although Hughes is no longer "alive," the Court's recognition there of the importance
of the need to protect access rights where there is a federal interest present
by using a uniform federal rule should have been considered by the Court in Wilson.
However, this factor was ignored and the Court failed to explain why the tribe's
interests in having a uniform federal rule apply were not given appropriate consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
In Bonelli and Hughes,
the Court's application of federal common law enabled the riparian owners to maintain
the riparian character of their property. However, if state law had been applied,
it would have resulted in a loss of access rights for the upland private property
owners involved. Since the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to apply fifth
and fourteenth amendment protections to prevent state confiscation of riparian
rights without just compensation, the Court in Bonelli and Hughes sought to provide
the needed protection by applying federal common law. As the Court indicated in
Corvallis, federal common law was improperly used in Bonelli, and the Bonelli
majority's reasoning was flawed in that it did not adequately explain how title
to property once passed from federal to state ownership could be subject to later
defeasance. The Bonelli Court also failed to properly analyze the requirements
of the equal footing doctrine. Although the Bonelli Court's legal analysis and
reasoning was faulty, the Court correctly recognized that there were valuable
private property rights -riparian rights, e.g., access rights - subject to being
taken by the state without adequate protection being afforded by the law. Since
in Corvallis the Court determined that federal common law could not be used to
protect the riparian rights of private owners, other methods of protection should
be considered to determine whether they might be applicable in a given situation
to protect a private owner's riparian rights from confiscation by a state without
just compensation.
Logically, the protection of private property rights would seem to be provided
by the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against taking without just
compensation. However, as indicated above, the Court has held that the taking
of riparian rights does not require compensation under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. The case history that supports this position should be reexamined
to determine whether it in fact justifies the Court's continuing exemption of
riparian rights from the list of property rights that cannot be taken without
just compensation by a state.
Some protection against an arbitrary taking of riparian rights by a state court
can be provided by reliance on the cases that hold a state court cannot radically
change the application of its law if such a change will diminish the rights of
a private property owner. This approach could be used by federal courts to prevent
state courts from altering the tests used to determine whether an accretive or
avulsive change has occurred. Consequently, state courts would not be able to
arbitrarily change the criteria used for deciding whether a change in a waterbody's
bounds was avulsive or accretive. Absent the application of constitutional safeguards,
state courts are completely free to apply the accretion and avulsion doctrines
in whatever manner they desire, regardless of past practice and precedence. This
could result in the acquisition of large tracts of land by a state without it
having to tender just compensation.
The Court in Wilson properly resolved the property issue before it as a matter
of federal law, but it failed to recognize a federal need for applying a uniform
federal rule. In Wilson, the Court failed to go beyond the factors set forth in
Kimbell to discuss the unique status, expectation and treaty rights of the Omaha
Indian tribe. Additionally, the Court placed an undue amount of weight on the
asserted need for intrastate uniformity when the Court should have looked at the
need for uniform treatment of all tribal lands similarly situated. Thus, this
holding was based upon an unnecessarily limited analysis of the factors that should
have been considered by the Court and a faulty analysis of some of the factors
it did consider.
Copyright(c) 1982 by the University of Wyoming
*Associate, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; J.D., Wayne State University,
1981; B.S.M.E. Michigan Technological University, 1977; Member, Wisconsin State
Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Professor
Robert Abrams and William Frey, Esq.
Notes:
1. Riparian rights
arise from ownership of land adjoining or underlying a stream. These rights
relate to use of the water and ownership of the soils beneath the waters. J.
SAX, WATER LAW PLANNING AND POLICY 1 (1968); Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 128
Ala. 335, 30 So. 645 (1900). See generally Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey,
22 RUT. L. REV. 621, 627 (1968); Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 NW. 159 (1930)..
2. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S.
447, 471-72 (1942).
3. The Court stated that "[a]though we have determined that federal law ultimately
controls the issue in this case, it is still true that '[c] ontroversies governed
by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules. .
. . Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a
matter of judicial policy. . . .'" Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note
2, at 671-72. See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 60, at 278-86 (3d
ed. 1976); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 356-57 (1966).
4. The United States Supreme Court has stated that an accretion is an addition
to land bounded by water which forms so slowly that it cannot be perceived.
Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 193 (1890). The accretion doctrine
is used to maintain the riparian character of land by granting soil accumulations
to riparian owners. Just as riparian owners stand to gain property if soil is
deposited on their property, they also stand to lose title to soil which is
gradually eroded into the water. United States v. Claridge, 416 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 961 (1970); Peterson v. Morton, 465 F. Supp.
986 (D. Nev. 1979). For a discussion of the accretion and avulsion doctrines,
see Note, Artifwi~al Additions to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion,
14 ARIZ. L. REV. 315 (1972). See also infra note 45.
5. A change in the bounds of a waterbody is deemed avulsive when there is a
drastic change which occurs rapidly and is easily perceived. It usually results
from a violent shift of water during a flood, storm or channel breakthrough
and when the doctrine applies, boundaries are held to be where they were prior
to the sudden change. See Bauman v. Choctaw-Chickasaw Nations, 333 F.2d 785,
789 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 965 (1965). See also Arkansas v.
Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 169-77 (1918); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361
(1892). In Smith v. United States, 593 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1979), the court
quoted from Bauman, supra, as follows: "Accretion" denotes the process by which
the area of owned land is increased by the gradual deposit of soil due to the
action of a bounding river or other body of water. Accretion occurs when the
change in the river is gradual and imperceptible. The gradualness of the process
distinguishes accretion from the more rapid, easily perceived, and sometimes
violent, shifts of land incident to floods, storms or channel breakthroughs
known as "avulsion." A sudden change in the channel of a river, as occurs in
the case of avulsion, does not affect title to the lands thus transferred from
one side of the river to the other. 593 F.2d at 984.
6. The constitutional basis of the equal footing doctrine was explained by the
Court in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), where the Court
concluded that: "The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were
not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the
States respectively. Secondly, the new States have the same rights, sovereignty,
and jurisdiction over this subject as the original States." Id. at 230.
7. In Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842), the Court stated
that "when the Revolution took place, the people of each State became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to
the rights since surrendered by the constitution." See also Pollard's Lessee
v. Hagan, supra note 6, at 229; Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 187 U.S. 479 (1903).
8. The only states not formed out of the public domain other than the original
13 states were Texas, Vermont, Maine, West Virginia and Kentucky. See 1 R. CLARK,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 40.2, at 248 n.19 (1967).
9. Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875).
10. Borax Consol., Ltd. V. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Knight v.
United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661
(1891); St Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1868).
11. Some jurisdictions determine ownership of land beneath their waters according
to the English rule which grants ownership of land beneath all nontidal waters
to riparian owners. 1 R. CLARK, supra note 8, 40.2. However, a majority of
states use the American rule which provides that as an incident of sovereignty
the state owns all land beneath the high water mark of its navigable waters.
Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850);
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6; Martin v. Waddell, sup- a note 7.
12. As states were formed out of the public domain, they acquired title to the
lands beneath their navigable waters upon their admission to statehood pursuant
to the equal footing doctrine. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-40 (1894).
13. Ottawa Shores Home Owners Ass'n v. Lechlak, 344 Mich. 366, 73 N.W.2d 840
(1955); Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d
712 (1949); State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949); Heimbecher v.
City and County of Denver, 90 Colo. 346, 9 P.2d 280 (1932); Allott v. Wilmington
Light & Power Co., 288 Ill.541, 123 N.E. 731 (1919).
14. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891).
15. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12; Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, supra
note 11; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6; Martin v. Waddell, supra note
7.
16. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867); Smith v. Maryland,
supra note 11; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, supra note 11; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
supra note 6. For a recent discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see North
Dakota v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 619, 623-25 (D.N.D. 1981).
17. In Pollard's Lessee, the Court explained that pursuant to the equal footing
doctrine, the new states upon admission to the union had acquired all the powers
of sovereignty except those delegated to the United States by the Constitution.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6, at 229.
18. Smith v. Maryland, supra note 11; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, supra note 11; Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6.
19. See infra note 31 and accompanying text on reserved water rights; see also
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
20. The Court in United States v. Oregon held that the issue of what waters
were navigable at the time of a state's admission to the union presented a federal
question. 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
21. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10; United States
v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391 (1903); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892); Knight v. United Land Ass'n, supra note 10; McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
22. In the eastern states riparian owners are entitled to use a reasonable amount
of the available water. Thus, as more persons acquire title to property on a
water body, all must share the available supply equally. As the western states
were formed, they adopted a system of prior appropriation to encourage development.
This approach guaranteed prior appropriators continued use of an undiminished
quantity of water.
23. 1 R. CLARX, supra note 8, 18.1-.2.
24. 43 U.S.C. 661 (1976).
25. Id.
26. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935).
27. 43 U.S.C. 321 (1976). Kansas) Nebraska and Oklahoma are not subject to
the Desert Land Act.
28. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P.258 (1900); Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co., 6 Cob. 443 (1882).
31. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908); see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
32. Arizona v. California, supra note 31, at 597; Winters v. United States,
supra note 31.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8.
34. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); United States v. Chicago
Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941)
35. When the United States reserves the flow either of a navigable or non-navigable
stream pursuant to its navigational power, it is exercising an established power
derived from the Commerce clause that is superior to whatever state interests
may exist. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
36. The Property clause states: "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular
State." U.S. CONST. art IV, 3, cl. 2.
37. Winters v. United States, supra note 31; United States v. Rio Grande Dam
& Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
38. 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
39. Id. at 264.
40. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
41. Id. at 540.
42. See United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). The Court, in San
Francisco, stated that pursuant to the Property clause: "The power over the
public land thus intrusted to Congress is without limitations. 'And it is not
for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress
to determine'." Id. at 29-30 (quoting Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523,537
(1911)).
43. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 142 (1937) ; Surplus Trading
Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650 (1930).
44. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246
U.S. 158, 169-77 (1918); Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 189
(1890); Smith v. Whitney, 105 Mont. 523, 74 P.2d 450 (1937). See also Comment,
Land Accretion and Avulsion: The Battle of Blackbird Bend, 56 NEB. L. REV. 814
(1977).
45. See New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836). In New Orleans,
the Court discussed the doctrine of accretion and stated that every riparian
is "subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory; and as
he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot be held accountable
for his gain." Id. at 717. See Note, Courts-Navigable Waters-State Law, Not
Federal, Determines Riparian Rights to Accretions, 54 N.D.L. REV. 505, 506-07
(1978).
46. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973), rev'd, Oregon ex
rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
47. Reliction is the term used to describe the process whereby water recedes
from land that it formerly covered. Hammond v. Shepard, 186 111.235, 57 N.E.
867 (1900).
48. See supra note 5.
49. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 624 (1912); St. Louis v. Rutz,
138 U.S. 226, 245 (1891).
50. Nebraska v. Iowa, supra note 5. In this case the Court discussed the accretion
and avulsion doctrines and stated with respect to the avulsion doctrine: But,
on the other hand, if, deserting its original bed, the river forces for itself
a new channel in another direction, then the nation, through whose territory
the river thus breaks its way, suffers injury by loss of territory greater than
the benefit of retaining the natural river boundary, and that boundary remains
in the middle of the deserted river bed. For, in truth, just as a stone pillar
constitutes a boundary, not because it is stone, but because of the place in
which it stands, so a river is made the limit of nations, not because it is
running water bearing a certain geographical name, but because it is water flowing
in a given channel, and within given banks.... Id. at 362.
51. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
52. The Rules of Decision Act stated that: [T]he laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 34, 1 Stat. 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
1652 (1976) and the term "civil actions" replaces "trials at common law").
In Swift v. Tyson, supra note 51, the Court interpreted the phrase "laws of
the several states" as referring to only state statutes and "local" common law
rules. The distinction that emerged under Swift between local and general law
was not expressly articulated by the Court, but it was clear from the Swift
decision that whether a state had an applicable law was of no relevance in determining
what law applied.
53. 304 U.S. 64(1938).
54. The Erie doctrine is not applicable to issues governed by federal law even
when the suit is based on diversity. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co.,
317 U.S. 173 (1942). See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1013 (1953).
55. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
56. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938). The use of federal law in interstate disputes reflects a recognition
of the need for resolution of such disputes before a neutral third party, and
the propriety of using federal decisional law in this type of situation has
long been recognized. As stated in the Federalist papers, "[n]o man ought certainly
to be a judge in his own cause. . . . This principle has no inconsiderable weight
in designating the federal courts as the proper tribunals for the determination
of controversies between different states. . . ." THE FEDERALIST No.80, at 538
(A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
57. 28 U.S.C. 1331 (a), 1332 (1976).
58. Federal courts were provided jurisdiction over "[c]ases in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority" by the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. III, 2, cl. 1.
59. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
60. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
(quoting Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretin
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797,800
(1957)).
61. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 59, at 367.
62. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
63. Id.
64. Recently the Court rejected the assertion that there was a federal common
law right of contribution among antitrust conspirators. Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Raddiff Materials, Inc. __ U.S. __ 101 5. Ct 2061 (1981). In Texas Industries,
the Court stated that: [F]ederal common law exists only in such narrow areas
as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our
relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases. In these instances, our
federal system does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law,
either because the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are
intimately involved or because the interstate or international nature of the
controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control. Id. at 2067.
65. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The Court held that
federal question jurisdiction existed because Milwaukee had violated the federal
common law of nuisance and, further, it found that the federal common law had
not been pre-empted by the Federal water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Id.
In a recent decision, the Court found that the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA
had significantly altered the water pollution laws and that Congress, by those
amendments, had thoroughly addressed water pollution concerns. Thus, the Court
held that Congress, by its actions subsequent to its prior decision, had pre-empted
the use of federal common law in this area of the law. City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois ____ U S 101 S. Ct 1784 (1981).
66. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra note 2; United States v. Standard
Oil Co., supra note 62; D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
supra note 2; Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343,350 (1939).
67. See Mishkin, supra note 60, at 812; Comment, Adopting State Laws as the
Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1976).
68. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note 2.
69. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 59. In this case, a check
drawn by the United States was stolen and cashed on a forged endorsement. The
United States sued the bank which had presented the check for a breach of its
guaranty on the endorsement. If Pennsylvania law applied, the United States
would have been estopped from asserting its claim as a consequence of its delay
in notifying the bank of the forgery. However, the Court held that federal law
controlled.
70. Id. at 367.
71. See lA J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE pt. 2, 0.324 (2d ed. 1981).
72. 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
73. Id. at 33-34.
74. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 62; Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
75. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra note 60.
76. Id.
77. Cf. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956); Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver County, supra note 74, at 210.
78. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra note 60; Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribe, supra note 2.
79. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
507-08 (1954).
80. Mishkin, supra note 60, at 813.
81. Id. at 810-34; see United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 62, at
310.
82. Supra note 10. Los Angeles asserted that it held title pursuant to a grant
by the California legislature. Borax, on the other hand, claimed superior title
by virtue of a preemption patent issued by the federal government.
83. Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United
States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); Brewer-Elliot Oil Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922); Packer V. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1891)).
84. Borax Consol., Ltd. V. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 22-27.
85. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., supra note 3; United States v. Oklahoma
Gas & Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206 (1943). In Wallis the Court had to determine whether
state or federal law controlled the validity of oil and gas leases which transferred
the rights to exploit oil and gas deposits on the public domain. In its opinion,
the Court stated that: In deciding whether rules of federal common law should
be fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises
must first be specifically shown. . . . whether latent federal power should
be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress. Even
where there is related federal legislation in an area, as is true in this instance,
it must be remembered that "Congress acts against the background of the total
corpus juris of the states. . ." 384 U.S. at 68 (quoting H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953)). Thus, state law was held
to control the issues in dispute since it was determined that there was no significant
conflict between the state and federal interests present.
86. Supra note 44.
87. Id.
88. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 wall.) 46 (1874); Jones v.
Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150 (1855).
89. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, 1 provides: The state of Washington asserts its
ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to
and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs
and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the
banks of all navigable rivers and lakes.
90. 26 wash. 2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946).
91. Hughes v. State, 67 wash. 2d 799, 816, 410 P.2d 20, 29 (1966).
92. Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44, at 292.
93. Id.
94. 201 U.S. 332 (1906).
95. Id. See also Note, Riparian Rights: The Law Returns to its Former Course,
23 LOY. L. REV. 563, 568-69 (1977).
96. Joy v. City of St. Louis, supra note 94.
97. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., supra
note 46 and infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text; Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900); United States v. Denby, 522 F.2d 1858 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Schwarz, 460 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v.1,078.27 Acres of Land, 446 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.1971).
98. Supra note 46.
99. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note
6.
100. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 318; see Oklahoma v. Texas,
268 U.S. 252 (1925).
101. When the Bonelli Cattle Co. acquired the land in 1955, 580 of the original
590 acres were submerged beneath the river. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra
note 46, at 316.
102. The State claimed to own all property up to the pre-Hoover dam ordinary
high-water mark. After the dam began to operate, less of the subject land was
covered by the river's high water mark. Id at 317.
103. Id. at 316. In Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 5, at 175, the Court stated
that the doctrine of reemergence "amounts to no more than saying that where
the reliction did but restore that which before had been private property and
had been lost through the violence of the sea, the private right should be restored
if the land is capable of identification."
104. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971).
105. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 319-20.
106. Id. at 321.
107. Id. at 326.
108. Id. at 328.
109. Id. at 331 (citing Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44, at 298) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
110. Id. at 325-30; Note, supra note 45, at 509-10.
111. Supra note 46.
112. Id. The property in dispute had been included in a pre-statehood federal
grant.
113. Id. at 372-73.
114. State ex "el. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 272 Or.
545, 536 P.2d 517, reh'g denied, 272 Or. 545, 538 P.2d 70 (1975); see Commissioners
v. United States, 270 F. 110 (8th Cir. 1920).
115. Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., supra note
46, at 370-71.
116. Id. at 372. The Court stated that, "Pollard's Lessee . . . holds that the
State receives absolute title to the beds of navigable waterways within its
boundaries upon admission to the Union, and contains not the slightest suggestion
that such title is 'defeasible' in the technical sense of that term." Id.
117. Id. at 376.
118. Id. at 381-82.
119. Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 5; Nebraska v. Iowa, supra note 5.
120. Illinios v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 65; Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., supra note 56.
121 Supra note 5.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 119-20.
124. United States v. Forty-three Gallons of whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876).
125. The courts have held that vested treaty rights cannot be impaired by legislation
or state court decisions. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.2d 634 (D.
Neb. 1931), aff'd, 59 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1932).
126. The federal government has the power to manage and control tribal affairs
on reservations but must do so within Constitutional bounds. United States v.
Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938).
127. 414 U.S. 661 (1973).
128. Supra note 2.
129. Id. at 660.
130. Id. at 670-71 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, supra note
127).
131. An interstate compact was entered into by Nebraska and Iowa in 1943. Id.
at 672. It was held that the compact governed what law would control the resolution
of interstate boundary disputes. Nebraska v. Iowa, supra note 5. Consequently,
the Court could not use a uniform federal rule in Wilson based upon the fact
that the dispute at issue involved an interstate boundary.
132. In Kimbell the Court had to decide what law governed the relative priority
between liens arising under a federal loan program and private liens. After
deciding that federal law governed resolution of the dispute the Court questioned
whether it should adopt state law as the federal rule of decision. In analyzing
this issue the Court stated that: Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a
nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial plolicy "dependent upon a variety
of considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental
interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law." [W]hen there
is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated
as the federal rule of decision. Apart from considerations of uniformity, we
must also determine whether application of state law would frustrate specific
objectives of the federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solicitous
of those federal interests. Finally, our choice of law inquiry must consider
the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships
predicated on state law. United States V. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra note 2,
at 728-29. The Court in Kimbell found no need for a uniform rule, and it further
determined that adopting state law would not adversely affect federal interests.
Therefore, state law was adopted.
133. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note 2, at 674.
134. Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra note 2,
at 730).
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, 2, which states as follows: This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. Borax Consol., Ltd. V. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10.
138. Oregon ex rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., supra note
46, at 377 n.6.
139. Id.
140. In a post-Hughes decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that its state
law of accretions determined whether lands formed on upland adjacent to the
Atlantic Ocean were owned by the State or the upland owner. Borough of Wildwood
Crest v. Masciarella, 51 N.J. 352, 240 A.2d 665 (1968).
141. Unlike the situation in Hughes, in Joy the state court's decree did not
operate retroactively to radically change prior law.
142. See supra notes 82-84.
143. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 320; Shively v. Bowlby,
supra note 12, at 43; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 333 (1876).
144. Joy v. City of St. Louis, supra note 94; Wilcox v. Jackson, 88 U.S. (13
Pet.) 498 (1839).
145. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 16.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44, at 293.
148. Justice Stewart stated that: Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition
that the law of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual
States to develop and administer. And surely Washington or any other State is
free to make changes, either legislative or judicial, in its general rules of
real property law, including the rules governing the property rights of riparian
owners. Nor are riparian owners who derive their title from the United States
somehow immune from the changing impact of these general state rules. . . .
For if they were, then the property law of a State like Washington, carved entirely
out of federal territory, would be forever frozen into the mold it occupied
on the date of the State's admission to the Union. It follows that Mrs. Hughes
cannot claim immunity from changes in the property law of Washington simply
because her title derives from a federal gra nt. Like any other property owner,
however, Mrs. Hughes may insist, quite apart from the federal origin of her
title, that the State not take her land without just compensation. Id. at 295.
149. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977).
150. The radical change by the Hawaii Supreme Court was effected in McBryde
Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973), cert. denied, McBryde
Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 976 (1974), where it determined what water rights
were possessed by landowners located adjacent to the Hanapepe River. The court
in its decision rendered two holdings that varied radically from its prior decisions
in that area of the law. First, it asserted that the State owned all surplus
water in the river and, second, it held that acquired water rights could not
be transferred.
151. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment was found to proscribe court enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (due process clause).
152. Chang, Uuraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts "Take" Property? 2 U.
HAWAII. REV. 57, 63-67 (1979).
153. The Hawaii federal district court in a subsequent decision also found that
the Hawaii Supreme Court's radical departure from prior law constituted a taking
without just compensation. Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D.
Hawaii 1978).
154. 640 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1981).
155. Id. at 706-07 (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)).
156. See discussions of Hughes supra in text accompanying notes 86-97 and Bonelli
supra in text accompanying notes 98-110.
157. Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44, at 292.
158. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 320. The Court stated
that "[t] he present case, however, does not involve a question of the disposition
of lands, the title to which is vested in the State as a matter of settled federal
law." Id.
159. Id. at 331-82.
160. As the Court stated in Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12, at 58: Grants
by Congress of portions of the public lands within a Territory to settlers thereon,
though bordering on or bounded by navigable waters, convey, of their own force,
no title or right below high water mark, and do not impair the title and dominion
of the future State when created; but leave the question of the use of the shores
by the owners of the uplands to the sovereign control of each State, subject
only to the rights vested by the Constitution in the United States. See Hardin
v. Jordan, supra note 14; Barney v. Keokuk, supra note 143; Mumford v. Wardwell,
supra note 16; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supranote 6.
161. Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, supra note 11, at 65-67.
162. For a recent Court opinion discussing the navigational servitude, see Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), where the Court found that the
federal government could take action that would diminish or impair a riparian
owner's access rights to water without being required by the Constitution to
compensate the owner for his loss. See also United States v. Rands, 359 U.S.
121 (1967). See Note, The Navigational Servitude and the Fifth Amendment, 26
WAYNE L. Rev. 1505 (1980), for a discussion of the history of the navigational
servitude and the gradual expansion of its scope.
163. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
164. id. at 674.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
166. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
167. Supra note 2.
168. See supra note 124.
169. See supra text accompanying note 164.
170. A treaty entered into with an Indian tribe prior to 1871 must be accorded
the same dignity and protection that would be given to a treaty with a foreign
nation. Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344 (C.C.D.
Mich. 1852) (No. 14,251); Anthony v. Veatch, 189 Or. 462, 220 P.2d 493, reh'g
denied, 189 Or. 462, 221 P.2d 575 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 923 (1951);
Matter of Adoption of Buehl, 83 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). The status
of Indian tribes as sovereign nations for treaty negotiations was prospectively
abrogated by Congress on March 3,1871.25 U.S.C. 71 (1976).
171. A treaty was entered between the United States and the Omaha Indians on
March 16, 1854. 10 Stat. 1043. See United States v. Omaha Indians, 253 U.S.
275, 277-78 (1920).
172. Treaty rights cannot he diminished by the admission of a state into the
union. Holcomb v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla, 382 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1967);
State v. Gurnoe, 53 Wis. 2d 390, 192 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
173. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note 2.
174. If the Supreme Court intended state law to be adopted only when it accurately
reflected federal principles, it was not explicitly set forth in Wilson.
175. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 108 Ariz. 258, 495 P.2d 1312 (1972).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 118-22.
177. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 22.
178. Id. at 27.
179. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra note 43, at 142; Surplus Trading
Co. v. Cook, supra note 43, at 650.
180. Arizona v. California, supra note 31; Winters v. United States, supra note
31.
181. Arizona v. California, supra note 31; Winters v. United States, supra note
31.
182. Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44.
[Land and Water Law Review, 1982]